Current funding mechanisms can impede the efficient use and integration of telemedicine services. Telemedicine has developed in Australja against a background of complex funding arrangements and interwoven health-care responsibilities. These impediments are'not unique to telemedicine but are accentuated by its ability to cover different locations, clinical areas and purposes. There is also a link between economic evaluation and funding mechanisms for telemedicine. While economic evaluations provide important information for the efficientallocation of resources, the funding environment in which telemedicine isestablished is also crucial in ensuring that services are efficient. Given these complexities, should telemedicine be funded? We conclude that this will depend on: the objectives and priorities of the health system; the efficiency of telemedicine relative to that of other forms of health-care delivery; and the funding environment. In terms of resource allocation processes, the optimum scenario is likely to be where the decision to invest in telemedicine services is made taking local needs into account, but where considerations such as market structure and network compatibility are examined on a broader scale and balanced against the principles of efficiency and equity.
Well documented market failures in health-care have resulted in governments around the world playing a major role in its provision and fundtng'<. An important part of this role is to allocate health-care resources efficiently. This function is complicated by the lack of information about the relative costs and effectiveness of alternative health-care interventions.
Economics is concerned with how to allocate resources efficiently and equitably. In health-care, the key areas in which economics can contribute are in the analysis of incentives and in the economic evaluation of health-care interventions. Analyses of incentives inherent in health-care structures and funding arrangements provide insights into how providers and consumers are likely to respond to different price signals (which may be actual or shadow prices). This assists in determining which structural and funding arrangements are likely to lead to the most efficient and equitable outcomes. Economic evaluation is concerned with identifying the resource use and consequences of alternative health-care activities, to provide information about which interventions are likely to be more efficient.
The implementation of telemedicine has resource and outcome consequences, and telemedicine should therefore be compared with existing methods of delivery (i.e. economic evaluation). Positive results from economic evaluations are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for efficiency. It also requires the development of appropriate funding and delivery arrangements. Thus far, there has been relatively little analysis of telemedicine services in terms of either economic evaluation or funding mechanisms. This paper reviews the experience of telemedtclne in Australia from an economic perspective and concludes by outlining a funding model for telemediclne.
Telemedicine in the Australian health-care system
Two features are of particular interest: the complex payment structure of the Australian health-care system, and Australia's geography. Although Australia is a highly urbanized country, the 1996 census showed that about 30% of its population lived in rural and remote areas', The extent of remoteness has meant that Australians have historically used technology to bridge distances. The School of the Air, established in 1951, and the Royal Flying Doctor Service, established in 1928, are examples of this.
Australia has an unevenly distributed medical workforce. Table 1 shows that rural and remote areas have far fewer primary care providers and specialists in internal medicine per 100,000 population than metropolitan areas. This shortage has received Widespread media and political attennonv', Another feature which has had an important effect on the development of telemedicine is Australia's federal system of government, in which different levels of government are responsible for different aspects of the health-care system. At the centre of the system is Medicare, a universal tax-funded health insurance scheme that provides:
(1) subsidized access to ambulatory medical services through the Medical Benefits Scheme (MBS), an open-ended fee-for-service scheme funded by the federal government and provided privately; (2) subsidized access to prescription drugs through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), an openended scheme funded by the federal government and provided privately; (3) free access to public hospital care and community health services, funded and provided by state/ territory governments but with tight spending controls.
In addition to its universal insurance scheme, Australia has a large private health insurance sector which also receives substantial federal government subsidies. Thus, depending on where and by whom a service is provided, the funding source may differ, as well as the incentives and budget constraint faced by the funder, provider and consumer. No single agency has sole responsibility for the health-care needs of an individual patient, and this leads to a narrow focus of health-care provision and limited coordination between different parts of the health-care system'>, It has also led to considerable emphasis on cost-shifting, where healthcare agencies shift responsibilities (and therefore costs) to other sectors of the health-care systems.
Given its land size, population distribution and the maldistribution of its medical workforce, telemedicine would appear to be an ideal method of delivering health services to Australians living in rural and remote areas. In addition, Australia has a good telecommunications infrastructure. However, the structure of the health system has had a significant effect on the development and integration of telemedicine. As Alexander noted, one of the key determinants of how telemedicine has developed in Australia has been the funding of services, with the 'crux being a shift in resources and income from some institutions to others", In the last decade, Australian governments have invested in numerous telemedicine projects. Most of these have started in the public systems funded (and provided) by state governments. This is partly because most telemedicine applications, with the notable exceptions of private telepathology and teleradiology services, are ineligible for MBS subsidies.
The Australian and New Zealand Telehealth Committee (ANZTC) noted over 175 telemedicine projects, each of which comprised one or more telemedicine sites", More funding is on the horizon. For example, the government of New South Wales (NSW) recently announced the establishment of a further 51 telemedicine sites in that state", The federal government's Networking the Nation programme will also assist the establishment of telemedicine projects across the country. Telemedicine projects in Australia have had mixed success, with some.failing and some not being as successful as initially envisaged!". For example, in a Melbourne emergency department a fully operational telemedicine project was not used because it was driven by the technology rather than clinical need11 . Even in successful projects, telemedicine may be under-used. As part of the Networking North Queensland project, 197 hours of videoconferencing was recorded at 10 sites over 12 months. Only 10% of this time was taken up by clinical activity (i.e. where the patient was present or where health professionals discussed specific patient assessment and treatment options)'>. Data from an established NSW telemedicine project involving three sites showed that 116 sessions were provided over three months, but patients were present in only seven of them 13. Telemedicine's mixed success in Australia may be the result of a general trend away from publicly provided ambulatory services (i.e. public hospital outpatient services) and towards private services subsidized by the MBS. Over the period 1985-98, the proportion of ambulatory services provided in public hospitals fell by 40 %, whereas the per capita number of services funded by the MBS grew by 43%14-1 6. Most telemedicine services, which are ineligible for MBS funding and which could increase costs to the public hospital, may be viewed unfavourably by either the private workforce or hospital administrators. Fig 1 shows the types of clinical activities in which Australian and New Zealand telemedicine projects are involved. While the number of clinical activities has expanded, mental health still represents the largest clinical field. About S% of Australian and l OOk of South Australian psychiatrists are involved in telepsychlatry" . There are several explanations for the emphasis on psychiatry in Australian telemedicine, some of which are economic. First, there are very few psychiatrists in rural and remote areas. Approximately 92% of Australia's 1900 psychiatrists practise in metropolitan areas ". Second, videoconferencing is suited to the type of services that psychiatrists can offer!", Third, psychiatrists tend to practise in both public and private sectors and approximately 14% of them already pro vide rural outreach consultations. This indicates that there is a certain level of flexlbility in how a psychiatrist can be remunerated. Depending on the location of the consultation, psychiatrists can be paid through the MBS o r by the publ ic hospital. Since a large proportion of telemedicine services are provided to outpatients!', this is likely to be an important factor in the growth of mental health services delivered using telemedicine. This level of flexibility is not as evident in other sectors. Given this incentive structure, it is easy to see wh y telemedicine has developed in Australia in the way that it has. Telemedicine is subject to the same problems of lack of integration and coordination of services that beset most aspects of health-care in Australia, resulting from the different sources of funding . Within such a complex system, the opportunity for new methods of service delivery to be distorted by perverse incentives is considerable, subject to potentially costly mistakes, and unlikely to lead to the efficient integration of a useful technology.
Funding telemedicine to encourage efficient provision . ............................................................................. .
The challenge for health service managers in Australia is to ensure that telemedicine is provided and funded in a way that encourages the efficient provis ion of services. The key criterion for efficiency is that goods and services are produced up to the point at which marginal benefits equal marginal costs. A funding model Should set the incentives such that the decis ion to invest in telemedicine remains neutral. That is, a decision maker ha s to assess whether the benefits of running a telemedicine service warrant the cost s, when compared with other methods of delivering the service.
K van Gool et 0/. Economic perspective on Australian telemedicine
Viney and Haas considered a number of funding models for telemedicine in terms of their potential to encourage efftdency'", Four broad funding models were analysed. These were mainstream funding (no specific funding for telemedicine), output-based funding (e.g. fee for service), block grants (e.g. an annual fixed grant), and cost and volume contracts (see below). They argued that, given the range of funding arrangements for hospitals and health services that already exist, only cost and volume contracts are likely to encourage the efficient provision of services.
Under the cost and volume model a hospital or health service would need to justify the establishment of a telemedicine service by assessing it against alternative service development proposals. Once the service had been established it would be funded on a recurrent basis with a block grant relating to activity. Funding agreements would also be established between the relevant hospitals or health services. The agreement would specify the level of funding, the source of funds and the level and type of telemedicine activity. This would reflect how the provision of telemedicine had changed traditional utilization and referral patterns. The agreement would also have provision to be reviewed if activity fell outside an agreed level of variation". There may be a case for the federal or a state government to be a party to the agreement (e.g. if the service were being funded specifically to address unmet need and involved overall growth in funding).
The focus of this recommendation was on developing funding arrangements which provided local decision makers with appropriate incentives to assess the costs and consequences of implementing telemedicine as an alternative to traditional methods of service provision. However, this relies on local decision makers being equipped to make this assessment. Two aspects of telemedicine militate against this. First, the limitations of evaluation methods mean that any evaluation of telemedicine is unlikely to provide all the information required by local decision makers. Second, the nature of telemedicine means that local decision makers are unlikely to be able to assess the true social costs and benefits of the service.
Limitations of evaluation methods
To justify the implementation of a telemedicine service, local managers require good information from evaluation, particularly economic evaluation. This represents a major challenge. Despite the publication of a number of frameworks for the evaluation of telemedicine services 2 O-22 , relatively few economic evaluations have been undertaken, and the results have been mixed.
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Three separate review studies have all concluded that there was insufficient evidence to make generalizable conclusions about either the effectiveness or the costeffectiveness of telemedicine23-2S. Hakansson and Gavelin concluded that 'it makes little sense to talk about cost-effectiveness of telemedicine in general'>. In other words, the results of economic evaluations are context specific, and the incremental costs and effectiveness of telemedicine will depend on what the current methods of treatment are. Current methods of treatment will vary with geographical factors and institutional arrangements. A further problem is the pace of technological change, which means that information from existing evaluations may not reflect the effectiveness or relative costs of new equipment.
True social costs and benefits
There are a number of reasons why local managers are unlikely to be in a position to make an appropriate assessment of the true costs and benefits from a social perspective. First, telemedicine equipment can be used for various purposes (e.g, dinical, educational and administrative). Joint usage makes the costing of telemedicine complicated because the cost of the equipment cannot be attributed to a single application.
Second, telemedicine requires a capital investment which may result in savings in other sectors, although the overall cost to the agency making the investment may rise. For example, the savings resulting from fewer patient transfers may be enjoyed by the patient, providers, other agencies or by another level of government. From a societal perspective, telemedicine may have net benefits, but these do not necessarily accrue to the agency which makes the investment.
Third, each additional telemedicine site added to the network may create greater flexibility in the available workforce or allow wider clinical applications. Hence, the entire network gains in value beyond that of the local expenditure on telemedicine equipment.
Fourth, telemedicine may replace existing services and therefore affect historical referral and service patterns between facilities/providers. For example, for the local purchaser, the telemedical provision of a particular diagnostic test may be cheaper. However, competition with telernedicine may lead to the traditional service provider becoming less viable, leaving the community with fewer services.
Fifth, only a few companies tend to supply telemedicine equipment in Australia. High set-up costs (especially costs associated with setting up a reliable maintenance network) make entry for other vendors difficult. In the combined NSW, Victorian and South K van Gool et 01. Economic perspective on Australian telemedlclne Australian markets, one company has a market share of 71% and a second company has a market share of 28%8. While greater competition between vendors may reduce prices, this has to be balanced with the need for the telemedicine network to remain compatible. The telemedidne network will be more flexible and valuable if all sites can communicate with each other. Currently, the incentives and opportunities allow vendors to behave strategically, with the possibility of these companies acting anti-competitively. The likelihood of this will rise if the market consists of many purchasers and only a few suppliers.
Sixth, telemedicine is highly dependent on the telecommunications market. Telecommunications, including ISDN lines, are available in most rural and remote parts of Australia (although very sparsely populated parts of the country are not covered by this service). This infrastructure has been highly subsidized and remains monopolized by a telecommunications company with a government majority shareholder. These two factors introduce price distortions into the telecommunications market and prices probably do not reflect resource costs.
Seventh, telemedicine services may increase the utilization of health-care services in rural areas, where distance may previously have acted as a barrier to people accessing them. The demand for a new telemedicine service may be greater than that for the conventional service, because telemedicine has the potential to tap into the underlying level of 'unmet need' for healthcare in rural communities. Ultimately, costs may rise, even though services may be more efficient and health outcomes improved. If local areas face increased overall costs as a result of telemedicine, then this will act as a disincentive to invest in such technologies, possibly leading to a level of investment that is below the social optimum.
Eighth, resource allocation is more complex if equity of provision is taken into account. Equity is an important consideration in most health-care systems. Telemedicine can reduce travel costs, waiting times and increase the availability of medical provision, thereby improving equity of access. Equity is an important yet complicating aspect of telemedicine because there may be times where efficiency has to be traded for equity. That is, there may be times where these two objectives compete with each other.
Finally, the identification, measurement and valuation of outcomes pose particular challenges in telemedicine. For example, telemedicine may provide patients with a higher standard of care by making access to second opinions easier, care closer to home and diagnosis earlier. Some of these effects may be measured through health outcomes (e.g. earlier diagnosis, reduced waiting time). However, fulfilling some Journal of Telemedicine and Telecare Volume 8 Number 5 2002 of these objectives may also result in significant nonhealth outcomes (e.g. reassurance for patients). This suggests that economic evaluations should incorporate some measurement and valuation of patient preferences.
What is clear is that until the factors outlined above are taken into account, the results of telemedicine evaluations may misrepresent the true social value of the benefits and costs.
A telemedicine funding model
Given the issues described above, the development of efficient funding arrangements for telemedicine involves balancing a number of factors. There are strong arguments for developing a funding model that empowers local managers to make resource allocation decisions reflecting the local relative costs and benefits of telemedicine and traditional service provision. However, it may be impossible for local managers to have all the information necessary to allocate resources efficiently from a societal perspective. A funding model should reconcile these two aspects.
What is required to reconcile these factors is an approach that involves implementing cost and volume contracts to maximize the responsibility of local managers to make resource allocation decisions, combined with specific-purpose funding to address factors that are beyond the scope of the local manager. This would entail an agency (e.g. the federal or state government) making funds available to establish telemedicine projects, leaving local areas with the responsibility for meeting the variable costs of the service. The level of funding assistance provided by such an agency should equate to the difference between the local areas' benefits and the social benefits.
Making local managers responsible for the variable costs means that they will purchase services from a variety of health-care providers. The inherent incentive is to purchase telemedicine services efficiently and up to the point where telemedicine remains more attractive than alternative methods of service delivery.
This approach can also assist in dealing with equity issues. The cost and volume model provides incentives for local managers to make resource-allocating decisions based on efficiency. The equity issue (which is not unique to telemedicine) then becomes, 'How much is society willing to pay for equity of access to rural and remote areas?' This additional expenditure may again be part of the grant provided to local areas, but the extent to which equity is taken into account should also depend, in large part, on the existing overall funding mechanism. K van Gool n 01. Economic perspective on Australian telemedlclne This model also assists in overcoming some of the Bsues discussed in the previous section. By combining the purchasing power of several health agencies, an agency such as the federal or a state government can oversee the implementation of a compatible telemedicine network. Furthermore, given the dominant position of one or two companies, combining purchasing power may be an appropriate way to combat any potential anti-competitive behaviour.
This approach suggests the need for a national framework in funding policy. Current funding arrangements are built around the various jurisdictions of federal, state, public and private sectors. Given the issues highlighted above, telemedicine would probably be more efficient if the funding boundaries of those jurisdictions were redrawn. The alternative system, where funding is uncoordinated and where disparate funding sources create incentives to shift costs and responsibilities to other agencies, is likely to lead to the inefficient use of telemedicine.
The funding framework outlined above has been designed to counter some of the problems inherent in the Australian health-care system. To the extent that these problems also occur in other health-care systems, this framework may be useful in wider application.
